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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that promising an agent free information would crowd out costly information
acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case where priors
are symmetric. For asymmetric priors, agents are predicted to increase their information acquisition when
promised free information in the future. We test in the lab whether such crowding out occurs for both sym-
metric and asymmetric priors. We find theoretical support for the predictions: when priors are asymmetric,
the promise of future “free” information induces subjects to acquire costly information which they would
not be acquiring otherwise.
JEL Classifications: C72, C90, D44, D80.
Keywords: information acquisition, rational ignorance, experiments.
1 Introduction
The impact of information provision is a major theme in the literature on consumer choice: Bollinger et
al. (2011) on calories for Starbucks purchases, Chaloupka et al. (2015) on smoking warning labels, Bhar-
gava et al. (2017) on improvements in the presentation of health insurance plans, and Allcott and Taubinsky
(2015) on comparisons of light bulb technologies.1 Information provision is also considered an important
tool to improve political choices. León (2017) studied the impact of information on monetary penalties for
abstention on turnout in Peruvian municipal elections. Larreguy et al. (2020) gives evidence of the impact
of information on government performance on voting outcomes in Mexico. The role of information provi-
sion in “nudging” behavior appears by now well-established. Yet, the interaction between free information
provision and individuals’ acquisition effort is underexplored. In this paper we study how crowding out of
information acquisition relates to the timing of the free information provision.
It may appear that the promise of free information in the future might merely crowd-out information
acquisition by an agent. Yet, it turns out it can actually incentivize information acquisition efforts. The
intuition is that additional information that does not make you change your choice has no (instrumental)
value. Unless one is ex-ante indifferent, a small amount of information will do little to change posterior
beliefs, and will, therefore, not affect choices.2 That is, weak signals do not affect optimal behavior and are
payoff-irrelevant ex-post, no matter their realization. Thus, the Radner and Stiglitz (1984) observation that
the marginal value of small amounts of information is usually zero. This implies that individual demand for
information would normally exhibit discontinuities at zero: there is a minimum scale at which information
should be acquired. Unless reaching this threshold is sufficiently cheap, people may want to stop paying
attention and act based on their prior beliefs. This is the well known Radner-Stiglitz non-concavity in the
value of information.3
A promise of delivering free additional information, after an individual completes her costly acquisition,
may be used to “smooth out” this non-concavity. Indeed, if an agent knows that additional information will
be provided, and has to decide on her own effort before observing whatever may be told to her later, anything
she learns on her own would be valuable with positive probability. As long as future help is expected, the
marginal value of small amounts of information is no longer zero. Rather than substituting for individual
effort, promised free information may complement it. Hence, such promise may indeed stimulate acquiring
small amounts of information, which otherwise should never be acquired. We provide a model of promising
free information in the future as an incentive and test it in the lab.
Note that substitution intuition is not completely wrong. As previously mentioned, if the agent is indif-
ferent between actions, arbitrarily small amounts of information become valuable. In this rare knife-edge
case, she may hope to free ride on any promised future help, thus, crowding out her effort. As this relies on
initial exact indifference, it would not be something one could expect to observe often in real life. Yet, this
allows us to introduce a complementary subtle test for the theory in the lab.
This straightforward and intuitive point has not, to the best of our knowledge, been made or tested.
It is, however, a common implication of costly information acquisition environments. In this respect, our
work relates to the recent theoretical and experimental work on rational inattention (Caplin and Martin,
1For a recent review, see Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018).
2If without additional information the agent is indifferent between actions, arbitrarily small amounts of information should be
sufficient to break this indifference. This, however, is readily seen to be a rare knife-edge case.
3Chade and Schlee (2002) have shown that the Radner-Stiglitz non-concavity is an extremely robust feature of costly information
acquisition environments.
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2015; Caplin and Dean, 2015; Caplin and Martin, 2018; Dean and Neligh, 2017). In common with these
studies, we explore the consequences of agents rationally deciding how much attention they would like
to pay in a costly information environment. Promising additional information in the future allows us to
directly vary the set of available informational strategies. In this sense, the interaction between individual
information-acquisition effort and timing of free information provision we explore here may be seen as a
novel implication of rational inattention.4
Though a promise of free information may create incentives for costly information acquisition that
would not exist otherwise, it would not improve the quality of individual decision, nor the welfare of the
decision-maker. This result follows straightforwardly from Blackwell (1962).5 In some settings, however,
we may expect greater individual learning to have spillovers on others. In fact, this reasoning may be behind
the typical prohibition for jurors to talk about the evidence they listen to during the course of a trial. Jury
discussion is supposed to occur only after they listen to every bit of evidence presented. In Hannaford
et al. (2000), for example, the authors show intriguing evidence of increased drop out by jurors in a field
experiment in which these instructions were relaxed, which lends support to the hypothesis we have just laid
out.
The experimental test follows the approach of recent laboratory studies on costly information acquisition
(Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Elbittar et al., 2016; Grosser and Seebauer, 2018).6 Our experimental design
allows us to explore the predictions of the model using both between- and within- subjects data. Results are
consistent with the predictions of the model: offering future information encourages greater investments in
information acquisition. Furthermore, when we explore the rare knife-edge case of indifference, we find, as
predicted, that information acquisition reverses with the promise of future information.
In section 2 we provide a theoretical model of attentional response to variation in the timing of free
information provision. Section 3 introduces the experimental design and section 4 describes our data and
empirical analysis. To encourage you to read along, we promise to report the results of the experiment and
conclusions in the last two sections.
2 Theory
We consider a standard information acquisition setting with two states and two actions.7 Specifically, the
two possible states of the world are Ω = {R,B}. The agent assigns a prior probability P (R) = β ∈ (0, 1)
to ω = R, chooses a ∈ {r, b}, and her utility U depends only on a and ω.
We assume that the agent is indifferent between the two states, as long as her decision is correct
(U (R, r) = U (B, b) = 0), while her attitude towards the two possible errors may differ, so that U (B, r) =
−q and U (R, b) = − (1− q). Indeed, with these parameters the agent would be willing to choose a = r if
4A somewhat similar effect has been noted by Caplin and Martin (2018) who explored, from a rational inattention standpoint,
how varying default options presented to subjects may nudge them to either acquire information or to “drop out”.
5This is striking, and is an important aspect of our analysis, since policy-makers often seek to induce individual informedness
under the presumption that this is a social good.
6These studies in juries establish a framework in which potential informational spillovers from increased study generated
through delayed communication between jury members may be explored. It is of interest that, in the last two studies referenced,
the subjects consistently acquired less information than predicted for the experimental setting. Elbittar et al. (2016) propose that
this may arise from biased priors, which effectively lead to the drop out from information acquisition of the sort we study in this
paper. Offer of future information, which in this setting may be interpreted as arising from jury deliberation, would be expected to
help resolve this problem.
7This simplified setting corresponds to our experimental environment, but the results presented below are fairly general, as
follows from Radner and Stiglitz (1984) and Chade and Schlee (2002).
3
and only if P (R) ≥ q. Thus q ∈ (0, 1) may be interpreted as the degree of certainty necessary for the agent
to choose a = r.
The agent observe a stream of signals. Each signal Si ∈ {r̂, b̂} that agents will observe is binary and is
correlated with the true state of the world, so that P (Si = r̂|ω = R) = P (Si = b̂|ω = B) = p ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
.
Conditional on the true state, signals are i.i.d. Before choosing a ∈ {r, b}, the agent decides how many
signals she would like to purchase with a constant per signal cost c > 0. In addition, a fixed number of
free signals will be observed before the agent chooses how many signals she would like to purchase, v, and
the agent knows this. We concentrate on the interaction between the timing at which the free signals are
observed by the agent and her decision to purchase additional signals.
The posterior belief of a Bayesian agent who observes m signals Si = r̂ and k < m signals Si = b̂ is
P
(
R|m signals r̂ and k < m signals b̂
)
=
βpm−k
βpm−k + (1− β) (1− p)m−k
Since utility U depends only on a and ω, information only has an instrumental value. It is only ex-
ante valuable if it has the potential to change an agents action, a. The agent changes an action when
E[U(r, ω)|S] > E[U(b, ω)|S].8 Thus, the smallest number of signals such that observing them has ex-ante
positive value is
n∗ = min
{
k ∈ N : βp
n
βpn + (1− β) (1− p)k
> q >
β (1− p)n
β (1− p)n + (1− β) pn
}
·
As long as β 6= q and p is close enough to 12 (i.e., information comes in small increments), n
∗ > 1:
small amounts of information are useless. This is the manifestation of the Radner-Stiglitz non-concavity
in our setting. On the other hand, as long as we are promising to show the agent (right before she has to
choose her action) N ≥ n∗ − 1 signals in addition to whatever information she acquires, there will always
be positive value of acquiring even a single signal. Since without that promise acquiring a single signal is
useless, additional information we offer cannot displace the agent’s own information acquisition effort: it
can only be complementary to it.
There is, however, one special case in which any small amount of information is ex-ante valuable. This
happens if β = q, so that without any information she is indifferent between the two actions. In this case
standard Bayesian updating implies that she should choose a = r whenever m ≡ #{i : Si = r̂} is bigger
than k ≡ #{i : Si = b̂} and should prefer to declare a = b whenever k > m (the agent is indifferent
whenever k = m). If β = q, therefore, standard Bayesian updating coincides with the simple “count-
the-signals” rule of thumb, greatly simplifying the decision the agent faces. Notably, however, this is also
the case in which even minute amount of information would break the indifference, so marginal value of
information at zero is, in fact, positive. This, in turn, makes possible a reversal of the expected impact of free
information: there is no longer any non-concavity for the promise of future information to smooth, but the
agent may be tempted to free-ride on this promise. The particular case of β = q is, of course, non-generic,
but we shall be making an extensive use of this environment in our design.
As discussed above, except in the knife-edge indifference case, we may be able to induce greater infor-
mation acquisition by promising that more information will be given after the agent purchases information;
however, the additional learning will not improve the expected quality of the verdict. To see this, suppose
8This is the same as −(1− P )q > −(1− q)P , or P > q (where P is the posterior probability of the first equation).
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a total of n signals, Sf1 , ...S
f
n may be provided to the agent for free. If we choose to provide them at the
beginning, so that their realizations may be observed before the agent decides how many signals to purchase
at cost, she would be able to condition her decision on the observed realizations. Defining the difference
between the number of signals that indicate R and B as Xf = #
{
i : Sfi = r̂
}
− #
{
i : Sfi = b̂
}
, we
observe that, in order for the additional information to have any potential impact on the agent’s choice of
v, she would have to buy more signals than the observed realization of Xf . Indeed, suppose the number of
costly signals she purchases, s ≤ |Xf |. Then, even if all of the signal realizations are identical, the sign of
m − k is equal to the sign of Xf , implying the same choice of v. This implies that the expected value of
purchasing s ≤ |Xf | signals is equal to zero: she should either buy a lot of information, or none – Radner
and Stiglitz (1984) in action. Of course, even a single signal would be valuable if the free signals “tie”,
Xf = 0. This tie can only occur if the number of these signals n is even, in which case, irrespective of the
true state of the world it would happen with probability P
(
Xf = 0
)
= n!
(n2 !)
2 p
n
2 (1− p)
n
2 > 0.
If we instead promise to show the agent the same signals after she decides how many signals to purchase,
this will be her prior probability that Xf = 0. Hence, with positive probability even a single signal would
turn out to be valuable.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental task follows a standard information acquisition environment (Elbittar et al., 2016; Guar-
naschelli et al., 2018; Battaglini et al., 2010). Participants earn money if they correctly guess the true binary
state of the world, Ω = {R,B}, framed as guessing the color of a jar.9 Subjects received four free binary
signals, Si, corresponding to the two possible states, and could acquire additional signals at a cost. Our
treatment variable is the timing of free signals relative to the acquisition decision.
Participants know that the true color of a jar is equally likely to be Red or Blue. Jars contain 100 balls:
60 corresponding to the jar’s color and 40 of the other color. For each of 24 periods, participants guess the
true color of the jar and decide how many (up to 5) balls to acquire at a known cost of c each.10 Those who
guess correctly earn E$1,000 minus the cost of purchased balls; otherwise, they earn E$300 minus the cost
of purchased balls.
We deliberately chose to induce payoffs and initial priors so that without any information subjects were
exactly indifferent between the jars. As discussed in the previous section, this made the jar choice partic-
ularly simple: subjects needed merely to choose the jar corresponding to the color of the majority of the
observed balls. As we demonstrate in the next section, the subjects used overwhelmingly that heuristic.
This allowed us to concentrate on the information acquisition decision, which was our primary interest.
Before guessing the color of the jar, they know they will see, besides the number of balls acquired, the
color of 4 balls (at no cost). Treatments vary the number of free balls participants get to see after deciding
how many balls to buy. In treatment 0B, no (0) free balls are observed after their decision. Participants see
9In addition to the main jar-guessing task, there were three additional tasks that followed: a risk elicitation task using a multiple
price list, and two additional jar-guessing tasks (for 12 periods each). Participants knew that one of the four tasks was to be
randomly selected at the end, and their choice in a single (randomly selected) period for the task was to determine their earnings
from the experiment. The experimental earnings was the sum of the randomly selected choice plus the show up fee and a starting
balance of E$120.
10The cost of balls purchased is drawn in each period from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. Participants observe the
realized cost before deciding how many balls to purchase each period. In the first twelve periods, they do not learn the true state. In
the last twelve periods, they do obtain feedback from their guess. Instructions are available in Appendix D. Appendix C provides a
detailed description of the experimental protocols.
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all 4 free balls before the decision to acquire information. In treatment 2B, participants observe the color
of 2 free balls before and 2 after the decision to acquire additional information. Thus, they are promised
information (2 balls) in the future. Finally, in treatment 4B, participants know they will see all 4 free balls
after the decision to acquire information.
In addition, we have the exogenous variation in the realization of free signals prior to information acqui-
sition. This is a feature of our design which gives rise to different informational situations (updated priors)
with different predictions. Table 1 presents the predicted marginal value of each additional signal across
every informational situation in which a risk-neutral participant may find herself.
Due to the non-concavity in the value of information, the main prediction of the model is that, promising
future information -as in 2B relative to 0B- should induce greater information acquisition when the updated
prior is asymmetric (i.e., βω = 9/13). The opposite is true in the rare knife-edge case where the updated
prior leads to indifference (βω = 1/2). This is reflected in the marginal value of additional signals across the
different treatments and induced updated priors. The intuition is the following: Assume that in 0B, where
a participant observes four free balls before she decides how many to acquire at cost, she is shown at least
3 balls of the same color (βω = 9/13). Acquiring two balls or less does not provide evidence sufficient to
change beliefs. Thus, she would have to acquire at least 3 balls at cost for this additional information to
have any value. Given the cost of this investment, such a participant is likely to “drop out” by purchasing
no costly information at all. Contrast this with 2B where a participant observed both balls of the same color
(βω = 9/13). In this case, purchasing a single additional ball would make sense as the future information
(2 additional balls) can smooth out the non-concavity. Thus, whether she is in treatment 0B and observed
3 Red balls or in treatment 2B and observed 2 Red balls, a Bayesian subject should have identical prior
about the likelihood of a Red jar at the time of the information acquisition decision. However, purchasing a
single additional ball would only make sense in the latter case. Hence, in this setting (β = 9/13), we should
observe fewer drop out decisions in 2B as compared to 0B.
An additional advantage of this set-up is the effective oversampling of the otherwise rare knife-edge
case (βω = 1/2). In this rare case even small amounts of information matter and, hence, the effect of the
timing of free information provision is reversed.
4 Data and Empirical Analysis
We conducted two waves of sessions. In the first wave, 72 undergraduates (mainly) from Universidad
Francisco Marroquı́n participated in the experiment.11 Within each session, a third of the subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the three treatments; that is, we implemented all treatments within the same
session (to different subjects). We used the same set of (predefined random) draws across treatments. In the
second wave, 84 undergraduates from Chapman University took part.12 In each of these sessions, we used
i.i.d. draws for each individual decision. All subjects within a session participated in the same treatment
for the first 24 periods. In addition, for tasks 3 and 4, we repeat the main jar-guessing task for the other 2
treatments.13 Thus, in these sessions we have between-subject variation (in the first 24-period) task that is
comparable with the first wave, and within-subject variation from tasks 1, 3 and 4.
11Payments were converted to local currency at a rate of E$6 = Q1 (E$46.2 = 1USD) and participants received a show-up fee
of Q20 (2.6USD).
12Payments were converted to local currency at a rate E$40 per 1USD, and subjects received a show-up fee 7 USD.
13We have perfect balance regarding the order in which the within-subjects treatments were implemented across the 6 sessions.
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We exploit both the between- and within- subject variation in our data. We pool together data from
the main task in the 24 periods across the two waves for our between-subjects (BSs) data. In addition, we
take from the second wave the last 12 periods of the main task and the 12 periods of each of tasks 3 and 4.
This is our within-subjects (WSs) data. We report data from 156 subjects who took part in 12 sessions: six
12-subject sessions from the first wave of data collection, and six 14-subject sessions for the second wave.
Given our design, there are some ancillary predictions that we can rely on to check whether participants
understood the environment and behave consistently with a “rational” choice model –beyond the precise
main predictions of the model. First, Bayesian subjects should make their final decision by simply counting
the number of balls of each color they observe in total, and declaring the majority color as the color of the
jar (they would be indifferent in case of a tie). They do so 94.4% (96.5%) of the time in the BSs (WSs) data.
Second subjects react to information acquisition prices.14 Finally, as Table 1 illustrates, an idiosyncratic
feature of our experimental design is that purchasing a positive even number of balls is dominated. Since
the last of these would never make the subject strictly prefer to change her decision, it would never have a
positive value in expectation. We see that conditional on acquiring information, subjects tend to acquire an
odd number of signals 73.2% of the time (77.6% during the second half).15
We test our main hypotheses using both non-parametric tests and reduced-form regressions on treatment
effects. For our non-parametric tests, we take the average value of the variable of interest for each individual
across all 24 periods (and use that to make comparisons across treatments (BSs). For the WSs data, we
compare the average value of the variable of interest for each individual across all periods of each treatment
(24 for the first treatment, and the 12 periods for each of the other treatments). Thus, we have 52 independent
observations per treatment in the BSs data and 84 matched-paired observations for the WSs data.16 For BSs
we use the robust rank order test (Fligner and Policello, 1981) for pairwise comparisons, and the Kruskal-
Wallis test for comparisons of more than two categories (i.e., for βω = 1/2, 4B = 2B = 0B). For WSs data,
we use the Wilcoxon sign-rank test for pairwise comparisons, and the Friedman test for comparisons across
all three treatments for the knife-edge case. Except for the Kruskal-Wallis and Friedman tests, we report
p-values from one-sided tests since our model provides clear predictions regarding the direction of treatment
effects.
For the regressions, we separately estimate on the pooled BSs data and for the WSs data, indexing
subjects by i and periods by t, the following regression model:
Yit = α0 + α1β
ω= 1
2
t 2Bi + α2β
ω= 1
2
t 0Bi + α3β
ω= 9
13
t 2Bi + α4β
ω= 9
13
t 0Bi + γCostit +X
′δ + εit (1)
where our dependent variable is information acquisition, Yit, either at the intensive margin (a dummy on
whether any balls were acquired), or extensive margin (a discrete variable [0, 5] on the number of balls
acquired).17 Our independent variables are treatment-prior dummies, and we control for the cost of acquiring
information. X is a vector of controls that includes period (linear and squared), a dummy for the wave of
the data (task order controls) for BSs (WSs), and, in some WSs specifications also individual fixed effects.
14Although on average they acquire more information than predicted by the risk-neutral model, we observe that prices influence
their information acquisition decisions.
15We also estimate the probability of acquiring signals using a linear probability model. Our dependent variable is a dummy on
whether an even number of balls were acquired. Our independent variables are treatment dummies, cost of acquiring information,
period, period2, and wave.
16Tables 3 and 4 presents the summary of results by treatment and situation, separately for each wave.
17We also use equation (1) to examine the predictive accuracy of guesses as dependent variable.
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Our main hypothesis is that the offer of free information in the future increases information acquisition,
(1)Ha : α3 > α4. However, in the rare knife-edge cases, the effect reverses as free information in the future
substitutes for information acquisition, (2)Ha : α0 < α1 < α2
5 Results
Table 4 provides summary statistics of observed and predicted instances of “dropping out” (no information
acquisition), amount of information acquired, and correct guesses broken down by informational situation.
Figure 1 presents, separately for BSs and WSs, histograms of predicted and observed information acquisition
by treatment and informational situation.18 As the table and figures also illustrate, the share of observations
that involve no purchase of information is lower than predicted across all informational situations. Indeed,
the average number of balls purchased exceeds predictions in all situations.19 The table, as well as figures,
illustrates the main predictions of the model: under asymmetric priors (i.e., βω = 9/13 in top row) promis-
ing future information should induce greater information acquisition. This is especially noteworthy at the
extensive margin through the reduction in the mass at zero instances in the figures, and in the table, the
increase in the share of no information acquisition. However, the opposite is true in the rare knife-edge case
(βω = 1/2): promises of future information induce lower information acquisition.
(1.1) Ha (extensive margin): For given (non-symmetric) priors (βω = 9/13), subjects are more likely
to acquire information when free information is promised in the future (2B, 2 : 0) than when no future
information is offered (0B, 3 : 1).
Results: We find that the rate of information acquisition when future information is promised is .535
(.408) for BSs (WSs), compared to .345 (0.313) when no future information is promised. Using non-
parametric tests we reject the null hypothesis that the probability of acquiring information in 2B ≤ 0B
using either the BSs (U = 2.702, p = 0.003) or the WSs data 2B ≤ 0B (z = 2.475, p = 0.006).
Our reduced-form estimates confirm the results. The top panel of figure 2 plots the coefficients from
a linear probability model. Appendix Table 5 presents the full results from the regressions exploring the
extensive margin.20 We reject the null hypothesis using either a linear probability model (BSs: p = 0.004,
WSs: p = 0.015) or a random effects Logit model (BSs: p = 0.005, WSs: p = 0.009). Using the linear
probability model, we find that the probability of acquiring information increases by 8 − 17 percentage
points (depending on whether we use BSs or WSs) when future information is promised.
(1.2) Ha (intensive margin): For given (non-symmetric) priors (βω = 9/13), when free information is
promised in the future (2B, 2 : 0) subjects acquire more information compared to when no future information
is promised (0B, 3 : 1).
Results: With BSs (WSs) data, we find that subjects acquire on average 0.315 (0.125) more balls when
future information is promised. That is an increase of 37% (16%) compared to when no future information is
promised. Using non-parametric tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the amount of information acquired
2B ≤ 0B with the BSs data (U = 1.680, p = 0.046). For the WSs data the result is only marginally
significant (z = 1.542, p = 0.062).
18Appendix figures 4 and 5 present CDF’s of predicted and observed information acquisition decisions for BSs and WSs.
19Appendix table 3 contains both predicted and observed summary statistics by treatment, conditional on the realized draws
observed by subjects when they made their information acquisition decisions.
20For sake of brevity, in this section we report the p−values for a (one-sided) test of the alternative hypothesis that α3 > α4, as
described in equation (1).
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Reduced form results are only marginally significant. Using the random effects Poisson model (BSs:
p = 0.065, WSs: p = 0.051) or a random effects Tobit model (BSs: p = 0.058, WSs: p = 0.001).21 The top
panel of figure 3 presents coefficient plots for the random effects Poisson model. As the figure illustrates,
although our results are only marginally significant, they have the predicted sign and are consistent across
the sub-samples.
A further confirmation of the model is that a simple change in the parameters that modify the updated
prior to a knife-edge case (βω = 1/2) reverses the effects of promising future information.
(2.1) Ha (extensive margin): For symmetric knife-edge priors (βω = 1/2), subjects are less likely to
acquire information in 4B or 2B (1 : 1) than in 0B (2 : 2).
Results: We reject the null hypothesis that the probability of acquiring any information is equal across
treatments (χ2 = 13.862, p < 0.001 for BSs; Friedman = 195.2, p < 0.0001; for WSs). For pairwise
comparisons, we reject that 4B ≥ 0B (BSs data: U = −3.813, p < 0.0001; WSs data: z = −5.605,
p < 0.0001) , that 2B ≥ 0B (BSs data: U = −1.680, p = 0.046; WSs data: z = −3.953, p < 0.0001),
and that 4B ≥ 2B (BSs data: U = −2.2253, p = 0.013; WSs data: z = −3.341, p < 0.001). Our reduced
form models (reported in Table 5 and illustrated in the bottom panel of figure 2) also allow us to test these
hypotheses and overall we find strong support for them.22
(2.2) Ha (intensive margin): For symmetric knife-edge priors (βω = 1/2), subjects acquire less infor-
mation in 4B or 2B (1 : 1) than in 0B (2 : 2).
Results: In the knife-edge cases for BSs we marginally reject (χ2 = 4.752, p = 0.093) and for WSs
we strongly reject (Friedman = 194.96, p < 0.0001) the null hypothesis of equal information acquisition
across treatments. For pairwise comparisons that information acquisition is lower when information is
promised in the future, we reject using any test/data for the most extreme case (4B vs. 0B): 4B ≥ 0B
(BSs data: U = −2.260, p = 0.0119; WSs data: −2.870, p = 0.002). For our other hypotheses, although
results have the predicted sign in all cases, they are only statistically significant using the (more powerful)
within-subjects data: 2B ≥ 0B (BSs data: U = −1.194, p = 0.116; WSs data: z = −0.898, p = 0.019);
for 4B ≥ 2B, results (BSs data: U = −0.909, p = 0.182; WSs data: z = −2.431, p < 0.007). Our reduced
form results can be seen in the bottom panel of figure 3. Using the reduced form results we see again that we
consistently reject the null for the most extreme hypotheses 4B ≥ 0B using random effects Poisson model
and a random effects Tobit model. We only reject the other hypotheses (2B ≥ 0B and 4B ≥ 2B) using the
within-subject data.23
In addition to the main hypotheses, we find support for additional propositions of secondary importance.
As predicted by theory, we observe no difference in the decision quality across treatments with asymmetric
priors. Despite differences in information acquisition by treatment, the proportion of time the subjects
choose the correct jar color is no higher in 2B than in 0B (NPT: p = 0.368 for BSs, p = 0.6146 for WSs;
reduced-form regressions: p > 0.307 for BSs and p > 0.104 for WSs). However, in the rare knife-edge
situations where even small amounts of information are valuable, providing free information in the future is
expected to slightly increase the predictive accuracy of guesses. We find support for it when comparing the
21Appendix Table 6 presents the full results for the regression estimates.
22The only exception is 2B ≥ 0B, where the differences are not statistically significant with the pooled BSs data, although they
are significant at the p < 0.001 with the WSs data.
23Appendix Table 6 presents the full results for the regression estimates.
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most extreme treatments: 0B (2 : 2) < 4B (BSs: U = 2.136, p = 0.016, WSs: z = 3.607, p < 0.001).24
This lends further support to the theory.
6 Conclusions and Further Research
We present results of a laboratory experiment on the impact a promise of future information may exert on
individual information acquisition effort. We observe that offering future information encourages greater
costly information acquisition. Furthermore, when we explore the rare knife-edge case of indifference, as
predicted we observe that information acquisition reverses with the promise of future information. The
differences across treatments are more pronounced on the extensive than on the intensive margin: promise
of delayed information makes the agents less likely to choose not to acquire any information at all. As
predicted by the model, information acquired in this manner is, ex-post, useless: the quality of the overall
decision-making is unaffected.
Our ability to induce information acquisition through a promise of free information is, however, sugges-
tive of possible information spillovers in group information acquisition environments with communication,
such as juries: the possibility that we believe should be explored in future research. The effect we iden-
tify appears to be an important previously unobserved feature of costly attention environments and may,
therefore, be used to identify rational inattention in the field. IRB
In terms of institutional design, delay in information provision may be sufficient to discourage “infor-
mational drop out”: situations in which agents choose to forgo attentional effort and make decisions based
entirely on their prior beliefs (this appears to be a plausible explanation for certain typical features of the
common law jury system). It may also be a useful tool in experimental design, as it could be used to avoid
excessive drop-out by subjects that has been observed in some previous experimental studies (Elbittar et al.,
2016). It might also be a feature of the registered reports –the peer-review of pre-results submissions– to
encourage greater attention from reviewers.
Finally, this study poses some questions to the literature that evaluates the impact of free information
provision and begs to raise the bar. Since the information provided in most studies cannot be anticipated
at the moment of making information acquisition decisions, why do so many studies find a positive effect?
What is a good model that takes into account the non-concavity in the value of information that predicts such
effects? Could base rate neglect be the cause of such findings? Field experiments evaluating the effects of
free information provision need to answer these questions to improve our understanding of the mechanisms
through which they work.
24We also estimate the probability of guessing correctly the state using equation (1) with a linear probability model and a
random-effects Logit model. Our dependent variable is a dummy on whether they correctly guessed the color of the jar. Results are
presented in Appendix Table 7. Again we find support, rejecting the one-sided hypothesis that 0B (2 : 2) ≥ 4B, with p < 0.05 for
all specifications.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Marginal value of information acquisition
Updated prior Situation Ball 1 Ball 2 Ball 3 Ball 4 Ball 5
βω = 1/2
B4 3.46 0 2.76 0 2.32
B2 (1 : 1) 4.8 0 3.46 0 2.76
B0 (2 : 2) 10 0 4.8 0 3.46
βω = 9/13
B2 (2 : 0) 2.22 0 2.13 0 1.92
B0 (3 : 1) 0 0 2.22 0 2.13
βω = 81/97 B0 (4 : 0) 0 0 0 0 0.43
Notes: Marginal value of purchasing a ball, in percentages of the prize value at the moment of information acquisition.
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Table 2: Summary statistics by situation
Updated Prior Situation Obs. Share No Info Avg. Balls Purchased Avg. Correct
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
Between-subjects data
βω = 1/2
B4 1,248 0.749 0.453 0.675 1.345 0.695 0.684
B2 (1 : 1) 581 0.651 0.339 0.921 1.551 0.620 0.645
B0 (2 : 2) 423 0.319 0.253 1.324 1.730 0.521 0.617
βω = 9/13
B2 (2 : 0) 667 0.849 0.465 0.436 1.168 0.740 0.729
B0 (3 : 1) 614 0.957 0.655 0.212 0.853 0.725 0.712
βω = 81/97 B0 (4 : 0) 211 0.972 0.787 0.142 0.559 0.896 0.877
Within-subjects data
βω = 1/2
B4 1,008 0.736 0.546 0.641 1.14 0.683 0.676
B2 (1 : 1) 479 0.647 0.438 0.766 1.25 0.612 0.620
B0 (2 : 2) 361 0.307 0.343 1.30 1.50 0.589 0.554
βω = 9/13
B2 (2 : 0) 529 0.853 0.588 0.393 0.907 0.704 0.709
B0 (3 : 1) 490 0.951 0.694 0.245 0.782 0.702 0.682
βω = 81/97 B0 (4 : 0) 157 0.987 0.828 0.064 0.433 0.847 0.815
Notes: Summary statistics of predicted and observed actions for between- and within-subjects data, according to the updated
priors generated by the informational case (situation). “Obs.” denotes the number of observations collected in each informational
case. “Share No Info” is the rlative number of instances where no information was acquired. “Avg. Balls Purchased” denotes the
unconditional number of balls purchased. “Avg. Correct” is the share of instances of correct state of the world predictions (color of
jar guesses).
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Histogram of predicted and observed balls purchased by treatment and informational
case. Top panel for between-subject (BSs) data, and bottom panel for within-subjects (WSs) data.
Top row or each panel for βω = 9/13; bottom row of each panel for the rare knife-edge case of
indifference (βω = 1/2).
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βω=9/13, 2B
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 LPM (βω=9/13)
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βω = 1/2, 2B
βω = 1/2, 4B
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
BSs data WSs wave 2 data
LPM (βω=1/2)
 0B (2:2) omitted
Linear probability model estimates with one−sided 95% CI
Probability of Acquiring information
Figure 2: Coefficients plots for linear probability estimates of the effects of promising future
information on the decision to acquire information (extensive margin). Results from joint
estimates using all informational cases. Top panel (βω = 9/13) presents estimates of promising
two balls (2B) after information acquisition relative to the omitted category of no information
(0B) in the future. Bottom panel presents estimates of promising two (2B) and four (4B) balls
after information acquisition relative to the omitted category of no information (0B) in the future
for the rare knife-edge case of indifference (βω = 1/2).
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βω = 1/2, 2B
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 0B (2:2) omitted
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Information Acquisition
Figure 3: Coefficients plots for random effects Poisson model estimates of the effects of
promising future information on information acquisition decisions (intensive margin). Results
from joint estimates using all informational cases. Top panel (βω = 9/13) presents estimates of
promising two balls (2B) after information acquisition relative to the omitted category of no
information (0B) in the future. Bottom panel presents estimates of promising two (2B) and four
(4B) balls after information acquisition relative to the omitted category of no information (0B) in
the future for the rare knife-edge case of indifference (βω = 1/2).
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A Additional Tables
Table 3: Summary statistics by treatment
Treatment Subjects Share No Info Avg. Balls Purchased Avg. Correct
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
Between-subjects data
B4 52 0.749 0.453 0.675 1.35 0.695 0.684
B2 52 0.756 0.406 0.662 1.35 0.684 0.690
B0 52 0.744 0.541 0.577 1.101 0.685 0.708
Within-subjects data
B4 28 0.736 .546 0.641 1.14 0.683 .676
B2 28 0.755 .517 0.570 1.07 0.660 .667
B0 28 0.726 .589 0.595 .984 0.684 .657
Table 4: Summary statistics for main task (BSs data) by wave
Updated Prior Situation Obs. Share No Info Avg. Balls Purchased Avg. Correct
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
UFM
βω = 1/2
B4 576 0.743 0.340 0.753 1.679 0.733 0.724
B2 (1 : 1) 249 0.606 0.213 1.18 1.928 0.622 0.711
B0 (2 : 2) 200 0.345 0.200 1.3 1.935 0.502 0.660
βω = 9/13
B0 (2 : 0) 327 0.865 0.339 0.44 1.327 0.775 0.734
B0 (3 : 1) 279 0.971 0.577 0.143 0.993 0.742 0.767
βω = 81/97 B0 (4 : 0) 97 0.969 0.742 0.155 0.588 0.907 0.866
ESI
βω = 1/2
B4 672 0.754 0.549 0.609 1.058 0.663 0.650
B2 (1 : 1) 332 0.684 0.434 0.726 1.268 0.617 0.596
B0 (2 : 2) 223 0.296 0.300 1.34 1.547 0.538 0.578
βω = 9/13
B0 (2 : 0) 340 0.832 0.585 0.432 1.015 0.706 0.724
B0 (3 : 1) 335 0.946 0.719 0.269 0.737 0.71 0.666
βω = 81/97 B0 (4 : 0) 114 0.974 0.825 0.132 0.535 0.886 0.886
Notes: Summary statistics by treatment and information scenario for the main task (24 periods) of each wave, according to the
updated priors generated by the informational case (situation). “Obs.” denotes the number of observations collected in each
informational case. “Share No Info” is the rlative number of instances where no information was acquired. “Avg. Balls Purchased”
denotes the unconditional number of balls purchased. “Avg. Correct” is the share of instances of correct state of the world
predictions (color of jar guesses).
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Table 5: Information acquisition: extensive margin
Dependent variable: Purchased any balls?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βω =
1
2 , 2B 0.122** 1.325** 0.107*** 0.970***
[0.054] [0.542] [0.025] [0.209]
βω =
1
2 , 0B 0.189*** 1.675*** 0.230*** 1.932**
[0.060] [0.577] [0.031] [0.277]
βω =
9
13 , 2B -0.021 -0.169 -0.044 -0.415
[0.061] [0.551] [0.032] [0.277]
βω =
9
13 , 0B -0.187*** -1.535*** -0.124*** -1.179***
[0.055] [0.466] [0.035] [0.327]
βω =
81
97 , 0B -0.371*** -2.977*** -0.266*** -2.470***
[0.059] [0.577] [0.046] [0.522]
Cost -0.006*** -0.054*** -0.007*** -0.059***
[0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.005]
Period 0.010** 0.080** 0.001 0.007
[0.004] [0.035] [0.002] [0.015]
Period2 -0.000** -0.002* -0.000 -0.002
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Constant 0.892*** 3.449*** 0.726*** 2.677***
[0.050] [0.488] [0.029] [0.404]
σ2u 1.741*** 1.767***
[0.187] [0.221]
Individual fixed effects? No No Yes No
Wave / Task Order? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.533 0.533 0.446 0.446
P-values for one-tailed Wald tests
βω =
9
13 : 2B (2:0) = 0B (3:1) 0.004 0.005 0.015 0.009
βω =
1
2 : 2B (1:1) = 0B (2:2) 0.131 0.283 0.000 0.000
0B: 2:2 = 3:1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2B: 1:1 = 2:0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Observations 3744 3744 4032 4032
Number of clusters 156 156 84 84
Log Likelihood -2198.3 -1490.1 -1459.3 -1513.1
BIC 4478.8 3070.6 3001.5 3125.9
AIC 4416.6 3002.1 2938.5 3050.2
Linear probability model (1 and 3) and random effects logit model (2 and 4) estimates of the probability
of information acquisition. Estimates using between- (within-) subjects data reported in columns 1
and 2 (3 and 4).Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets. Omitted treatment
variable is baseline treatment 4B (βω = 12 ): no free information before decision to acquire information.
∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Information acquisition: intensive margin
Dependent variable: Number of balls purchased
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βω =
1
2 , 2B 0.170 0.551 0.093* 0.469***
[0.123] [0.361] [0.054] [0.112]
βω =
1
2 , 0B 0.309** 1.065*** 0.417*** 1.229**
[0.135] [0.363] [0.070] [0.120]
βω =
9
13 , 2B -0.112 -0.371 -0.166** -0.446***
[0.141] [0.361] [0.068] [0.113]
βω =
9
13 , 0B -0.370** -0.950*** -0.306*** -0.876***
[0.157] [0.363] [0.086] [0.120]
βω =
81
97 , 0B -0.889*** -2.096*** -0.892*** -1.953***
[0.226] [0.392] [0.218] [0.215]
Cost -0.024*** -0.055*** -0.030*** -0.066***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Period 0.029*** 0.069*** 0.005 0.002
[0.010] [0.020] [0.005] [0.007]
Period2 -0.001** -0.002** -0.000 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Constant 1.210*** 3.191*** 0.919*** 3.031***
[0.118] [0.318] [0.076] [0.247]
ln(α) -0.645 -18.850***
[4.044] [4.108]
ln(σu) 1.757*** 2.048***
[0.115] [0.172]
ln(σe) 1.694*** 1.823***
[0.033] [0.037]
Individual fixed effects? No No Yes No
Wave / Task Order? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 1.264 1.264 1.066 1.066
P-values for one-tailed Wald tests
βω =
9
13 : 2B (2:0) = 0B (3:1) 0.065 0.058 0.051 0.001
βω =
1
2 : 2B (1:1) = 0B (2:2) 0.141 0.080 0.000 0.000
0B: 2:2 = 3:1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2B: 1:1 = 2:0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Observations 3744 3744 4032 4032
Number of clusters 156 84
Log Likelihood -4469.7 -4523.1 -3977.3 -4208.1
BIC 9029.9 9145.0 8104.0 8524.2
AIC 8961.4 9070.3 7990.6 8442.2
Random effects Poisson model (1 and 3) and random effects Tobit model (2 and 4) estimates of the
amount of information acquired (number of balls purchased). Estimates using between- (within-) sub-
jects data reported in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4).Standard errors (clustered at the individual level for
specifications 1 and 3) in brackets. Omitted treatment variable is baseline treatment 4B (βω = 12 ): no
free information before decision to acquire information. ∗p < 0.010,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001
20
Table 7: Correct choice
Dependent variable: Choose correct color of jar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βω =
1
2 , 2B -0.035 -0.157 -0.067*** -0.257***
[0.027] [0.126] [0.022] [0.096]
βω =
1
2 , 0B -0.067** -0.312** -0.122*** -0.493***
[0.028] [0.125] [0.033] [0.138]
βω =
9
13 , 2B 0.041* 0.199* 0.038 0.201*
[0.024] [0.120] [0.024] [0.111]
βω =
9
13 , 0B 0.029 0.148 0.007 0.050
[0.023] [0.114] [0.021] [0.097]
βω =
81
97 , 0B 0.188*** 1.184*** 0.166*** 0.992***
[0.030] [0.250] [0.030] [0.204]
Cost -0.000 -0.002* -0.001*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Period -0.009** -0.048** -0.001 -0.002
[0.004] [0.021] [0.001] [0.006]
Period2 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Constant 0.773*** 1.250*** 0.712*** 0.849***
[0.031] [0.161] [0.018] [0.102]
σ2u -2.430*** -3.725***
[0.378] [0.852]
Individual fixed effects? No No Yes No
Wave/Task order? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.694 0.694 0.666 0.666
P-values for one-tailed Wald tests
βω =
9
13 : 2B (2:0) = 0B (3:1) 0.307 0.343 0.112 0.104
βω =
1
2 : 2B (1:1) = 0B (2:2) 0.161 0.140 0.058 0.047
0B: 2:2 = 3:1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2B: 1:1 = 2:0 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Number of Observations 3744 3744 4032 4032
Number of clusters 156 156 84 84
Log Likelihood -2367.9 -2253.7 -2595.1 -2523.0
BIC 4818.2 4597.9 5273.2 5145.6
AIC 4755.9 4529.4 5210.2 5070.0
Linear probability model (1 and 3) and random effects logit model (2 and 4) estimates of the probabil-
ity of correctly predicting the state of world (guessing the color fo the jar). Estimates using between-
(within-) subjects data reported in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4).Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level in brackets. Omitted treatment variable is baseline treatment 4B (βω = 12 ): no free
information before decision to acquire information. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B Additional Figures
Figure 4: CDF of information purchased by individuals during last 12 periods, by treatment and
information scenario for BSs
22
Figure 5: CDF of information purchased by individuals during last 12 periods, by treatment and
information scenario for WSs
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C Experimental Protocols
Upon arrival, subjects checked-in and assigned to a computer through which they interacted. Paper copies
of the instructions were distributed and video of instructions with audio were played at the beginning of each
experimental task. After instructions for each part and before subjects made decisions, they had to pass a test
to control for comprehension of instructions. Subjects had to correctly answer all multiple-choice questions
before moving on to the main task.25 They were allowed one incorrect attempt per question before the screen
locked and an experimenter was prompted. After each attempt (correct or incorrect), feedback was given to
subjects to reinforce learning. For our main task, the test questions controlled understanding for: baseline
probability of each state of the color of the jar (.5), conditional probability of balls being different from the
true color of the jar (.4), probability of independent draws from the same color (.6), estimating earnings for
guessing correctly after purchasing information, and independence of draws for the color of jars.
Across both waves, the first task consisted of 24 periods of our maininformation acquisition experimental
task (for BSs data). The second task was a risk elicitation task using a multiple price list framed in the context
of jars as state of the world. The third and fourth tasks were different across waves 1 and 2. In wave 1 our
third (fourth) task was 12 periods of a task intended to capture independence neglect (base-rate neglect). In
wave 2 sessions, we dropped the exploratory independence and base-rate neglect tasks. Instead, tasks 3 and
4 were each 12 periods of our main information acquisition task, changing treatments. In sessions 3 and
4 participants received different amounts of information after their information acquisition decision with
respect to previous task(s). These tasks give rise to our within-subjects data.
Participants knew that one of the four tasks was to be randomly selected at the end, and their choice
in a single (randomly selected) period for the task was to determine their earnings from the experiment.
The experimental earnings was the sum of the randomly selected choice plus the show-up fee and a starting
balance of E$120. This was determined upon completion of the four tasks.
After completing the four tasks, participants learned their payments and took part in a post experimen-
tal survey. In the post-experimental survey we collected general demographic data (gender, age, number of
siblings), unincentivized cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005), major and school, self reported GPA, fa-
miliarity with Bayes Theorem, number of math and stat courses taken and previous participation in research
experiments.
Each session lasted about 90 min, including survey and private payment. The experiment interface was
programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Software and supporting materials are available here.
Wave 1 had between subject treatment variation, within the same session. That is, subjects within each
session were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments and received video (with audio delivered
via headsets) for the corresponding treatment. After pilot sessions, we discarded data from 1 session from
wave 1 due to problems with the display of instruction videos in several computers that was not men-
tioned/revealed until the end of the session. We report data from six 12-subject sessions in wave 1.
Wave 2 had between subject treatment variation (assigned at the session level). In addition, we have
within-subject data by comparing behavior of an individual in tasks 1, 3 and four. We conducted six 14-
subject sessions perfectly balanced within subject treatment order.
25Number of questions for each task were between 3-5. Appendix D.2 shows the questions for the main task.
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D Instructions
This section presents the script used to run the wave 2 sessions and the slides to present instructions.26
Appendix section D.1 presents the instructions slides for the main task 4B 2B 0B treatment. Text in black
is common across all treatments. Instructions were presented through a video with audio that narrated the
slides. Full video of instructions available here.
Appendix sub-section D.2 presents the control questions that followed the instructions. Appendix sub-
section D.3 presents the script used to conduct wave 2 sessions.
D.1 Instruction Slides
Overview
This is an experiment about economic decision making. Various agencies have provided funds
for this research. If you understand the instructions (and depending on your decisions), you can
earn a considerable sum of money. At the end of today’s session you will receive your earnings
in cash, in private. In this experiment, the sums of money are expressed in Experimental Dollars
(E$). At the end of today’s session, we will convert your earnings into US Dollars, at an exchange
rate E$40 = $1. For today’s session, you will receive an initial payment of E$120.
It is important that you remain silent and not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need help of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
If you speak aloud, you will be asked to leave the experiment. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation.
Now we will describe the session in more detail.
Overview
Today’s experiment consists of four parts. In each part you will make some decisions. The
other participants will face similar decision-making tasks. However, their decisions will not affect
your earnings and you decisions will not affect their earnings.
When all four parts have been completed, one of those parts will be randomly chosen. In the
selected part one of your decisions will be chosen randomly and the result of said decision will
determine your earnings.
Your final earnings for today’s session will be the sum of your initial payment of E$120 and
your earnings in the decision which is randomly selected.
Introduction: Part 1
In the first part of the experiment there are twenty-four periods. In each period there are two
jars, one red and one blue. Each jar contains 60 balls which are the same color as the jar, and 40
which are the color of the other jar.
The computer will randomly select one of the two jars. You must predict the color of the jar
selected for that period. If you predict the color of the jar, you can earn up to E $1, 000.
To help you predict, you can observe the color of some balls from the jar. The computer will
show you 4 balls for free and you will have the option to buy up to 5 additional balls (at a COST).
26We choose instructions for wave 2 since they are in English. Instructions for wave 1 are available from the authors upon
request.
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Next, we will explain this part of the experiment in m ore detail.
Jars and balls
At the beginning of each period the computer randomly selects one of two virtual jars: red or
blue. The probability that the color of the jar is red is 50% and the probability that it is blue is 50%.
The color of the jar in one period does not affect the color of the jar in another period or of
another participant. That is, the true color of jar is determined independently of the color of jar in
another period and for other participants.
Each jar is filled with 100 virtual balls; 60 correspond to the true color of the jar and 40 are
the color of the other jar. That is, the red jar contains 60 red balls and 40 blue balls. The blue jar
contains 60 blue balls and 40 red balls.
In this way, the color of a ball corresponds to the true color of jar with a probability of 60%.
That is, if the true color of jar is red, when drawing a ball, it will be red with 60% probability and
will be blue with 40% probability. If the true color of the jar is blue, when drawing a ball, it will
be blue with 60% probability and will be red with 40% probability.
Obtaining Information
Before you make your prediction about the color of the jar, you will get information by observ-
ing the colors of several balls drawn from the jar which has been selected for that period. This will
work in the following way:
The computer draws a ball (chosen at random) from the jar for that period and records its color.
It then deposits the ball back into the jar and all the balls are mixed. Then, another ball is randomly
drawn and the color is recorded. The ball is again deposited in the jar and again the balls are mixed.
This process continues until all the balls shown in the period have been drawn and recorded.
That is, each time the computer draws a ball from the jar, 60% of balls in the jar are the same
color as the jar, and 40% of the balls are the other color.
Obtaining Information
Each period the computer will show you the colors of 4 balls taken from the jar at no cost. In
addition, you can buy additional balls.
[You will be able to see the colors of the 4 balls that the computer will show you at no cost
AFTER you decide how many balls to buy.]
[Out of the 4 balls that the computer will show you at no cost, you will be able to see the colors
of 2 of these balls BEFORE you decide how many balls to buy. The colors of the other 2 balls will
be revealed AFTER you decide how many you want to buy.]
[You will be able to see the colors of the 4 balls that the computer will show you at no cost
BEFORE you decide how many balls to buy.]
Each additional ball you buy will have a COST. In each period, the COST of the balls will be
determined randomly and will be a number between 0 and 100, all being equally probable. (The
COST in one period does not affect that of other periods or other participants.)
After having seen [the colors of the 4 [2] free balls and] the COST of the additional balls, you
will decide how many you want to buy, if you want to buy any.
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After you decide the number of balls you want to buy, you will see the colors of the free balls
and of the additional balls purchased.
Earnings from the prediction
After observing the colors of all the balls, you make your prediction regarding the color of the
jar for that period. If your prediction is correct, you will earn E$1, 000. If you do not correctly
predict the color, you will earn E$300. Regardless of whether you are correct or not, you will have
to pay the COST of the balls you bought that period.
That is, if your prediction about the color of the jar is correct, your earnings for the period will
be given by:
E$1, 000− COST · (# of balls purchased)
If your prediction is not correct, your earnings for the period will be given by:
E$300− COST · (# of balls purchased)
Feedback
During the first twelve periods, you will not be able to observe the true color of the jar at the
end of each period. In the second twelve periods, you will be able to observe the true color of the
jar at the end of each period.
Summary
1. In each period there are two jars and the computer will select one of these at random:
the RED jar with 50% probability or the BLUE jar with 50% probability.
2. You will observe for free the colors of 4 balls. In addition, you will have the option to buy 0
to 5 additional balls, at a COST (selected randomly from between 0 to 100 for each period).
3. The color of each ball corresponds to the true color of the jar with 60% probability.
4. You must predict the color of the jar selected for that period. If your prediction is correct,
you earn:
E$1, 000− COST · (# of balls purchased)
5. If you do not correctly predict the color of the jar, then your earnings for the period are:
E$300− COST · (# of balls purchased)
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D.2 Control Questions
After the instructions video ended, participants had to complete an Instructions Comprehension
Test which consisted of the following (multiple choice) questions:
1. What is the probability that at the beginning of the period the computer selects the color RED
jar?
2. If at the beginning of the period the computer randomly selects the BLUE jar, what is the
probability that when drawing a ball from the jar it is a RED ball?
3. Assume that the jar selected at the beginning of the period is RED. Assume also that the
computer has already drawn the 4 balls that it will show, and they are all red. What is the
probability that if you draw an additional ball, it is RED?
4. Assume you decide to purchase three balls, at a cost of E$50 each. Also, assume you cor-
rectly predict that the jar color is BLUE. If this decision is chosen at random for your pay-
ment, what would be your profit?
5. Assume that for the last period, the true color of the jar selected by the computer was BLUE.
What is the probability that for the next period the computer randomly selects the BLUE jar?
Participants had to answer all questions correctly in order to proceed to the experiment. If
participants selected the correct answer for a question, they received feedback and reinforced the
explanation for the correct response.
If participants selected the wrong answer, they received feedback and had a chance to answer
again. If they selected an incorrect answer for a second time, the screen was locked (and requested a
code that the experimental monitors had). It asked them to raise their hand so that the experimental
monitor could clarify any questions or misunderstandings the subject could have.
After all participants had correctly answered all questions, they proceeded with the experimen-
tal task.
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D.3 Script
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Script VOI 
30 minutes before the session begins: 
1. Restart the monitor computer and the computers in the subjects’ room 
2. Print VOI Script, InstrutionsComprehensionTest-Solution&Codes.pdf, and materials for subjects:  
 Instructions VOI T#__part-1.pdf  
 Instructions _ VOI_Risk__part-2.pdf 
 RiskTask.pdf  
 VOI T# Handout part 3.pdf 
 VOI T# Handout part 4.pdf 
3. Open the session # folder in the computer in the monitor room 
4. Leave printed instructions for part 1 in each subjects’ computers  
5. Turn on TV monitors and prepare to project the ppt “…Instructions – part 1” (Note: make sure the 
zTree screen is never projected; you can project from a different PC or use extend instead of duplicate 
mode).  
 Test to make sure volume is on at an appropriate level. 
6. In the monitor computer, open zTree and open the following zTree treatment files (.ztt):  
 1-VOI Task_english.ztt 
 2-Risk Task_english.ztt 
 3-VOI Task_english.ztt 
 4-VOI Task_english.ztt 
 5-Survey-VOI-english.ztq 
7. In addition to the client´s table, also open the subjects table, session table and parameters table.  
8. Change language to English in ztree treatments: Treatment >> Language >> English and in the zTree 
questionnaire (5-Survey-VOI-english.ztq) Questionnairre >> Language >> English  
Note that Number of subjects need not be adjusted, unless fewer than the 
number of subjects recruited (14) show-up for the experiment. In that 
case, only the Number of subjects should be adjusted (and it should be 
adjusted in all four (4) .ztt files. No need to adjust Number of groups. 
Matching should not matter, but if need to adjust, do: Treatment >> 
matching >> partner. 
Do not open the zleafs yet in the subjects’ computers.  
Please make sure that these 3 JPG files are in all of the subjects’ 
computers in C:\Experiments\VOI  
 image_risk_options.jpg 
 image_risk_JA.jpg 
 image_risk_JB.jpg  
Once subjects are seated: 
Read aloud to subjects: "Welcome. Today's experiment consists of four parts. The instructions for each 
part will be explained through videos. Videos in the screens in front will go over the instructions. You 
may follow the instructions on the instruction sheets provided. At the end of the instructions, you will 
participate in an instructions comprehension test to ensure that everyone understands the 
instructions." 
1. Start the ppt “VOI…Instructions – part 1” 
 When the video ends, launch the z-leafs. 
 
2. Run 1-VOI Task_english.ztt , once all subjects are connected 
 Be mindful if subjects raise their hand. If someone does raise their hand, go out (take 
InstrutionsComprehensionTest-Solution&Codes.pdf) and enter the code in their screen, make sure 
they understand the question they got wrong.   
 
3. Once everyone finishes, distribute instructions for part 2 (including RiskTask.pdf handout). 
Start the ppt “VOI_Risk – part 2” 
 When the video ends, run 2-Risk Task_english.ztt   
 (Note: same number of subjects as in previous task, 1 group, 0 practice periods, 1 paying 
period, Exchange rate 0.025, lump sum payment 0, show up fee 0) 
 Be mindful if subjects raise their hand. If someone does raise their hand, go out (take 
InstrutionsComprehensionTest-Solution&Codes.pdf) and enter the code in their screen, 
make sure they understand the question they got wrong.   
 
4. Distribute instructions handout for part 3. Start the ppt “VOI…Handout – part 3” 
 When the video ends, run 3-VOI Task_english.ztt   
 (Note: same number of subjects as in previous task, 1 group, 0 practice periods, 12 
paying period, Exchange rate 0.025, lump sum payment 0, show up fee 0) 
 [Note that there is no instructions comprehension test for this part] 
 
5. Distribute instructions handout for part 4. Start the ppt “VOI…Handout – part 4” 
 When the video ends, run 4-VOI Task_english.ztt   
 (Note: same number of subjects as in previous task, 1 group, 0 practice periods, 12 
paying period, Exchange rate 0.025, lump sum payment 0, show up fee 0) 
  [Note that there is no instructions comprehension test for this part] 
Read aloud to subjects: "The experiment is over. Thank you for your participation. While we prepare 
your payments, we ask that you complete a short questionnaire.” 
6. Run 5-Survey-VOI-english.ztq (while subjects complete the questionnaire, prepare to pay subjects.)  
 The amount to pay each subject is in the MoneyToPay variable, in the session table. 
 The zTree generated pay file (*.pay) will have the corresponding payment to each subject, with the subject 
name. 
 
7. Pay subjects 
 
Once subjects have left: 
 
1. Close zleafs. Close (and save) zTree .ztt files.  
 Put all data and zTree files in the data folder in the corresponding session.  
 
2. Record log file for the session.   
 
 
 
 
